One of the most polarizing debates at the heart of Enlightenment philosophy dealt with whether there could be such thing as common good without the existence of private interest. Prominent philosophers such as David Hume, The Earl of Shaftesbury, Adam Smith, and Francis Hutcheson, belonged to the school of “moral sense,” and argued that virtuous acts are not always a byproduct of self-interest. On the other hand, philosophers such as Bernard Mandeville, Claude-Adrien Helvetius, and Jeremy Bentham, firmly believed that man was principally motivated in all facets of life by pure self-love. While Smith and Hutcheson both strove to prove that self-interest is not the sole motivator of man, they go about proving this theory in two quite different ways. Similarly, Mandeville and Helvetius argue that there is no public good without self-interest, but prove their cases upon dissimilar grounds. Regardless of argumentative strategies, the issue that drove these thinkers to their respective schools of thought is one that philosophers, psychologists, and academics alike still struggle with today. That issue is whether man is capable of action that benefits the greater good without any benefit to himself. After a close analysis of the work of these philosophers, as far as I am concerned, the answer to that question is an emphatic “no.”
Francis Hutcheson, a Scottish minister and professor of moral philosophy, argued that human beings are not fundamentally motivated by self-interest, but by some innate feeling of empathy or benevolence to others that he refers to in An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue as “moral sense,” (Hutcheson An Inquiry). In his quest to establish the existence of “moral sense,” Hutcheson breaks the term down into two distinct categories of “good”: natural good and moral good. In regards to natural good, Hutcheson states, “The pleasure in our sensible perceptions of any kind, gives us our first idea of natural good, or happiness; and then all objects which are apt to excite this pleasure are called immediately good,” (Hutcheson 70). As Elmer Sprague neatly explains, natural good is any action to which an individual’s reaction is happiness. That which incites happiness is classified as good, and as a result all objects or actions that spark happiness within an individual are also classified as good (Sprague 794). Hutcheson continues, “Those objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are called advantageous: and we pursue both kinds from a view of interest, or from self-love,” (Hutcheson 70). It is here that Hutcheson makes the most important distinction between natural good and moral good, which is that natural good is pursued due to self-interest or self-love. Natural goods are able to please an individual in the immediate, and typically do not result in happiness or pleasure for anyone other than the individual that pursues it.
Hutcheson’s definition of moral good, however, is far more altruistic. He writes, “The word “moral goodness” in this treatise, denotes our idea of some quality apprehended in actions, which procures approbation, and love toward the actor, from those who receive no advantage by the action,” (Hutcheson 69). Moral good, then, is achieved through a perceivably selfless act that is met with the praise and appreciation of those who witness the action but do not actually benefit from that action. It is the benevolence of the action and perceived benevolence in the person, Hutcheson argues, that produces the love and admiration for the individual in whom this quality is observed (Sprague 795). The existence of the moral goodness of benevolence is predicated on the pleasure one gains from the contemplation of a benevolent act. Therefore, the level of morality of an act is dependent upon the observer’s judgment that the act is truly benevolent, and the degree of pleasure gained by the observer. The question that remains, however, is whether any act can be considered truly benevolent. How can an observer be confident that a benevolent action is not rooted in a deeper self-love that motivates the actor?
In A System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson makes his strongest case against the idea that self-interest is the sole motivator of man, and how it is “moral sense” that is ultimately superior to any amount of self-love, and thus the reason why common good can exist in the absence of self-interest. To prove his theory he asks, “are there not instances of men who have voluntarily sacrificed their lives, without thinking of any other state of existence, for the sake of their friends or their country? does not every heart approve this temper and conduct, and admire it the more, the less presumption there is of the love of glory and posthumous fame, or of any sublime private interest mixing itself with the generous affection?” (Kramnick 279). Hutcheson’s own answer to these questions is that while all of these notions are unquestionably true, they could not exist if self-interest is the sole motivator of man. Thus, Hutcheson explains, “There is therefore another ultimate determination which our souls are capable of, destined to be also an original spring of the calmest and most deliberate purposes of action; a desire of communicating happiness, an ultimate good-will, not referred to any private interest, and often operating without such reference,” (Kramnick 279). It is these types of actions, Hutcheson explains, that are only possible because of the individual’s innate moral obligation to the entirety of mankind. These examples of ultimate sacrifice go beyond the reaches of self-interest, and prove that all actions are ultimately determined by the “moral sense.”
Another member of the “moral sense” school, Adam Smith, employed a slightly different perspective in his argument against the supreme rule of self-interest in his work The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is interesting to note, however, that in Smith’s previous work he claimed that self-interest is absolutely crucial to the advancement of society and public good (Suttle 459). While Hutcheson’s theory is dependent upon the existence of a moral obligation to the greater good absent of any personal gain, Smith utilizes the presence of an “impartial spectator” that controls the conduct of all men. In his post on Smith, Vann perfectly captures the essence and purpose of the “impartial spectator.” Vann writes, “…to determine whether your actions are acceptable, imagine someone else is watching you. Smith believed that this concern for the judgments of other people is what gives all of us incentive to be moral in the first place,” (Bentley “Adam Smith”). Smith states, “When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves than by whatever concerns other men, what is it which prompts the generous upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others?” (Kramnick 286). If posed with this question, Hutcheson’s answer would have involved the existence of “moral sense” and benevolence that could overcome the strength of self-interest, but Smith’s conclusion is quite different. He does not believe in some abstract power of humanity that binds every individual on a deeper, more spiritual level, nor does he believe that benevolence is strong enough to counteract the impulses of self-interest. Instead, Smith writes, “It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge, and arbiter of our conduct… we are but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it… the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator,” (Kramnick 286). This line, however, still leaves room for the presence of self-interest in an individual’s effort to behave as nothing more than another member of a society bigger than oneself. Molly touches upon this conflict in her post “Were Mirrors Less Shiny in 1759?” when she says that Smith’s argument made her think about Facebook (Molly “Were Mirrors”). If the “impartial spectator” is what allows one to judge oneself from the perspective of another, one’s behavior is then dictated by a desire to be accepted. Thus, if one’s actions are motivated by a desire to be accepted, one receives pleasure or benefit from that acceptance, and can be traced to self-interest.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Hutcheson, Smith, and the school of “moral sense” was French philosopher Claude-Adrien Helvetius. In his work A Treatise on Man: His Intellectual Faculties and His Education, Helvetius vehemently opposes the concept of moral goodness and argues that public interest cannot exist without the foundation of self-interest because all interest is an effect of “corporeal sensibility,” (Kramnick 287). He writes, “Now that interest, necessarily founded on our love of happiness, cannot be anything else than the effect of bodily sensibility; because there all our pleasures, and all our pains have their source… I conclude that corporeal pains and pleasures are the unknown principles of all human actions,” (Kramnick 288). Unlike Hutcheson, who argued that a moral sense allowed one to derive happiness from the perceived morality of a benevolent action without actually realizing the benefits of that action, Helvetius firmly believed that the happiness that fuels interest is always the effect of bodily sensibility. Furthermore, while Hutcheson suggests that the result of this benevolence is an individual’s ability to act purely for the benefit of others, Helvetius’ theory dismantles the idea of benevolence and brings all actions back to their self-interested roots.
In his effort to prove that “corporeal sensibility” is the exclusive mover of man, Helvetius breaks his theory down into two types of pleasures and pains: present bodily pains and pleasures, and pains and pleasures of foresight or memory (Kramnick 288). It is these two variations of pleasure and pain that are the source of every decision, feeling, or emotion known to man. On the subject of remorse, for example, he explains, “Remorse is nothing more than a foresight of bodily pain, to which some crime has exposed us: and is consequently the effect of bodily sensibility… Remorse, therefore, owes its existence to the fear of punishment or of shame, which is always reducible, as I have already said to a bodily sensation,” (Kramnick 289). Whereas Hutcheson may have argued that remorse is a feeling dictated by one’s inability to act on behalf of another, Helvetius claims that remorse is simply born out of a fear of some punishment or scorn that an individual has previously experienced, and never wishes to experience again. Thus, self-interest is the sole motivator.
Helvetius’ pointed attack on Hutcheson and Shaftesbury’s theory of benevolence is a clear indication of how passionately Helvetius disagreed with the concept of “moral sense.” The greatest point of contention lies in the fact that while the English philosophers believed in the existence of benevolence, Helvetius vehemently opposed it. He writes, “What we call in man his goodness or moral sense, is his benevolence to others; and that benevolence is always proportionate to the utility they are of to him… Benevolence to others is therefore the effect of love for ourselves,” (Kramnick 294). With this statement of practicality, Helvetius is able to completely dissolve the concept that the root of a benevolent act lies in some greater moral obligation to humanity. Instead, Helvetius has reduced what the “moral sense” philosophers call benevolence to a simple act viewed as public good and still motivated purely by self-interest. When he asks, “What in fact is that original goodness or moral sense, so much boasted of by the English? What clear idea can we form of such a sense and on what fact do we found its existence?” he suddenly makes his audience realize that one must believe in benevolence if one wants to be convinced that public good can exist apart from self-interest. Once he has exposed “moral sense” as a belief rather than a theory predicated on fact or even reason, he is able to explain in more realistic terms why he feels certain emotions at certain times. He writes, “What do I feel at the presence of an unhappy person? A strong emotion. What produces it? The remembrance of pains to which men are subject, and to which I myself am exposed: such an idea troubles me, makes me uneasy… When I have assisted him, and see him no more, a calm takes place insensibly in my mind… when therefore I was afflicted at his presence, it was for myself I was afflicted… The love of others is therefore never anything else in man than an effect of the love of himself, and consequently of his corporeal sensibility,” (Kramnick 295-6). Though this act Helvetius describes can no longer be classified as benevolent, it still serves the common good.
Bernard Mandeville’s classic work The Fable of the Bees explores the necessity of both vice and virtue for societal advancement, and argues that if self-interest can influence public good, then perhaps other philosophers like Hutcheson and Smith are too critical of self-love. To demonstrate the positive relationship between vice and virtue, Mandeville employs the image of a beehive and describes the ways the bees interact with one another. The success of the hive, as Mandeville describes it, is dependent upon the corrupt and self-interested motives of the bees. He writes, “Vast Numbers thronged the fruitful Hive;/Yet those vast Numbers made ‘em thrive;/Millions endeavoring to supply/Each other’s Lust and Vanity,” (Kramnick 243). Mandeville affords several glimpses into the corrupt nature of the hive, such as, “Physicians valued Fame and Wealth/Above the drooping Patient’s Health,” or lawyers that “kept off Hearings willfully,/To finger the refreshing Fee,” (Kramnick 244). The point Mandeville aims to make with such descriptions is that despite the bees’ tendency to indulge their personal vices, they contribute to a fruitful and vibrant society through their indulgences. Once vice is eliminated from the equation, thus eliminating self-interest, production and advancement decrease and society as a whole must absorb the negative effects.
In his post on The Fable of the Bees, Malcolm’s reaction to Mandeville is certainly more in line with the school of “moral sense” than the school of “self-love.” Malcolm states that Mandeville’s claim that “Bare Virtue can’t make Nations live/In Splendor” suggests a lack of faith in the inherent decency of mankind. Malcolm writes, “Sure, the vice of vanity drives competition which in turn allows progress, but there are also those who help simply to help, who want progress not merely for their own gain, but for the benefit of others,” (Malcolm “The Fable”). It seems that, like Hutcheson, Malcolm believes in the existence of a human ability to act completely selflessly, purely because there is some inexplicable responsibility the individual possesses for the rest of humankind. In another one of his posts, however, Malcolm brings up a crucial question at the heart of Hutcheson’s argument that philosophers like Mandeville and Helvetius regarded as a weak link in Hutcheson’s case. Alex also touches on this subject in his reaction to Franklin’s definition of virtue (Alex “An Exercise”). In regards to Franklin’s “Self-Denial Not the Essence of Virtue,” Malcolm says that he agrees with Franklin “that any good act is worthy of praise,” (Malcolm “Appropriate Action”). If praise is a known byproduct of a selfless act, how can any observer claim with conviction that that act is in no way rooted in self-interest? Praise induces pleasure, pleasure results in happiness, and the pursuit of personal happiness is by its very nature motivated by self-interest. Hutcheson’s argument rests upon a fundamental belief that people like Franklin, Mandeville, and Helvetius could not take as truth.
The Enlightenment is commonly referred to as “The Age of Reason.” Human ability to reason was strongly emphasized by many philosophers of the time, and many believed that reason could unlock the most puzzling mysteries of the universe. Unfortunately for Hutcheson, Smith, and other members of the school of “moral sense,” reason tends to disprove theories that are built upon a belief rather than evidence. As a result, it is the theories presented by members of the school of “moral sense” that are most easily disproved through reason. Therefore, the only safe conclusion is that self-interest must be the sole motivator of man, but in no way is that a bad thing.
Works Cited:
Bentley, Vann. “Adam Smith and Internet Comment Sections.” Web blog post. ENGL 274: Benjamin Franklin and the Age of Enlightenment. Blogger, Web. 7 Sep. 2011.
Hutcheson, Francis. Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. London, 1725. Electronic.
Jaffe, Molly. “Were Mirrors Less Shiny in 1759?” Web blog post. ENGL 274: Benjamin Franklin and the Age of Enlightenment. Blogger, Web. 7 Sep. 2011.
Kramnick, Isaac. The Portable Enlightenment Reader. New York: Penguin, 1995. Print.
Malcolm. “Appropriate Action.” Web blog post. ENGL 274: Benjamin Franklin and the Age of Enlightenment. Blogger, Web. 12 Sep. 2011.
Malcolm. “Vices and Virtues.” Web blog post. ENGL 274: Benjamin Franklin and the Age of Enlightenment. Blogger, Web. 7 Sep. 2011.
Sprague, Elmer. "Francis Hutcheson and the Moral Sense." The Journal of Philosophy 51.24 (1954): 794-800. JSTOR. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
Suttle, Bruce. "The Passion of Self-Interest: The Development of the Idea and Its Changing Status." The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 46.4 (1987): 459-72. JSTOR. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
Tapper, Alex. “An Exercise in Virtue, and Persuasion!” Web blog post. ENGL 274: Benjamin Franklin and the Age of Enlightenment. Blogger, Web. 13 Sep. 2011.
